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 Despite considerable research, no consensus has yet emerged on 
the design of a sustainable pension system for Ireland. This paper 
takes a novel market-consistent approach and, in so doing, 
challenges the assumptions underlying the costing of alternative 
systems presented in Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006). It is 
shown that by ignoring investment risk and its consequences, the 
cost and value of pensions are materially understated. It is argued 
that risky investment strategies are not appropriate for modest or 
mandated pension savings and they propose, at the very least, that 
the state develops and maintains a market in index-linked stock to 
help pension savers manage investment risk. It is shown that a 
system based on mandatory personal pension savings in low risk 
government guaranteed investments is functionally very similar to a 
sustainable pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. The two systems are 
contrasted from the perspective of value-for-money for 
contributors. We conclude that the sustainable PAYG is superior, 
delivering pensions of the order of one-fifth higher for the same 
level of contribution due to lower administration costs. Accordingly, 
we propose a better solution than simply the state maintaining a 
market in index-linked securities: Ireland’s current PAYG system 
should be developed into a sustainable version that provides all 
mandated pensions.  
Abstract 
 
 The last couple of years have been a time of unprecedented 
research within both the pension industry and academia on the 
functioning of the pension system in Ireland. The activity was 
sparked in February 2005 by the Minister for Social and Family 
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Affairs when, after consultation with the Government, he requested 
the Pensions Board bring forward a full review of the Irish pension 
system. Two substantial reports were prepared under the aegis of 
the Pensions Board, National Pensions Review (2005) and, at the 
further request of the Minister, a supplemental report on a 
mandatory pension system, Special Savings for Retirement (2006). These 
reports, when coupled with survey studies of the operation of the 
existing system (for example, Hughes and Watson (2005); Steward 
(2005); Whelan (2006); Department of Social and Family Affairs 
(2005)), set out a comprehensive overview of the current system 
and possible alternatives.  
One of the issues central to the debate is the sustainability of our 
current system against the forces of reducing fertility, increasing 
longevity and the demise of the occupational defined benefit 
pension scheme outside of the public sector. Of course, Ireland is 
not alone in facing these challenges and, in fact, the adverse trends 
are somewhat less advanced in Ireland than in other developed 
economies. Accordingly, there is also a rich international literature 
on pension policy, complete with case studies of early 
implementation. Influential studies are World Bank (1994, 2005), 
with wide ranging discussion of the issues presented in, for instance, 
Barr (1998; 2000; 2001; 2002). Case studies of special interest are 
the recent fundamental reforms to the Australian and New Zealand 
pension systems, given their similarities with the Irish system until 
recently. Given the integration of our labour markets, the current 
proposals for pension reform in the UK in the Turner Reports 
(2004; 2005; 2006) and the UK Pensions White Papers (2006a; 
2006b) are of particular interest. Indeed, Ireland, the UK, New 
Zealand and Canada are currently the only developed economies 
where the state pension is designed to alleviate poverty rather than, 
as elsewhere, designed to provide income replacement in retirement.   
It seems we have never been better informed on pensions issues, 
nor so much confused.  Despite the focus on pension policy in 
Ireland over the last couple of years, no consensus had emerged to 
help narrow the range of options in the forthcoming Green Paper. 
The reports of the Pensions Board reflect the conflicting divisions 
of the representatives of the different factors of production in the 
economy, with labour (represented on the Board by the trade union 
movement) broadly supportive of any increase in coverage or 
adequacy of pension, and capital (represented by an employers’ 
association) broadly opposed to any such extension. This could 
reasonably have been anticipated as it has been the perspective of 
the parties consistently over at least the last hundred years (see 
McCashin (2004), Whelan (2006)). The surprise was that the 
representative of the Minister of Finance, and therefore the state, 
did not agree with the aims of pension policy (viewing them as 
more aspirational than firm targets) and generally opposed any 
measure that might increase the cost to be borne by the state. The 
Pensions Board did not achieve a consensus on principles of system 
design or financing, so its recommendations were rather piecemeal 
and unadventurous.  
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Yet a fundamental change in the landscape of pension provision 
in Ireland is upon us. Projections in the Pensions Board (2005) 
assume that the occupational defined benefit scheme outside the 
public sector will dwindle from now providing one-third of the total 
pension coverage in Ireland to nought in 50 years’ time. The Board 
is relying on policies to give further incentives to volunteer defined 
contribution arrangements to both fill the void thus created and go 
on to achieve the stated 70 per cent coverage targets (from the 
current 52 per cent coverage). If a mandatory system is envisaged 
then the Board propose a mix of a defined contribution 
arrangement with an increased level of the flat rate state pension. 
Yet, in terms of the adequacy target to replace 50 per cent of 
income on retirement, the Board (2006, p. 33) admits the superiority 
of the defined benefit design. 
The Board anticipates a fundamental shift in the design of 
pension coverage in Ireland from defined benefit to defined 
contribution.1 Yet there is little discussion on the key differences 
between these designs. Indeed the extensive costings provided in 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) reports on alternative systems conceal 
the significance of this change by ignoring investment risk and its 
possible consequences and, as such, the figures presented are not 
market-consistent. In this paper, we explicitly take account of 
investment risk at its market price. Quite a different picture emerges 
from this novel approach. Making due allowance for the market 
price of risk more than doubles the cost of pensions presented in 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) reports. The appropriateness of a risky 
investment strategy for modest and mandated pension savings is 
challenged and, as a key and costless policy action, it is proposed 
that, at a minimum, the state develops and maintains a market in 
index-linked stock to allow pension savers to manage investment 
risk.  
The commitment of the state to maintain a market in index-
linked securities is simply an undertaking that future taxation 
revenues be applied to meet its obligations under the debt 
instruments. This commitment creates a system that is functionally 
almost identical to the PAYG system, under which future taxation 
meets the costs of the future pensions. The two systems are 
contrasted – a system based on compulsory personal pension 
savings in low risk investments and a mandatory pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) approach. It is shown that both systems sustainably deliver 
very similar returns to contributors before administration expenses. 
The PAYG approach is shown to possess a number of theoretical 
1 In fact, the proposal made by the Pensions Board to grant higher rate tax relief to 
employees on pension contributions can be expected to accelerate further the 
demise of private sector defined benefit schemes. Under the proposal, for 
employees on the standard rate of tax, it would be financially more advantageous 
for the employer to cease making provision through a defined benefit scheme and 
increase the salary of employees correspondingly. By so doing, if the employee 
saves the salary increment in a pension arrangement, s/he can be better off (as tax 
relief is at the higher rate) and the employer no worse off (as no employer PRSI 
contributions are levied on the saved increment).  
and practical advantages over the alternative. Materially, when the 
lower administration charges associated with the sustainable PAYG 
system are allowed for, the PAYG system can be expected to 
produce pensions of the order of 20 per cent higher for the same 
contributions than the alternative system. 
Before concluding, we take a brief look at the pension systems in 
the very long term, and the challenges posed by fertility rates below 
replacement. 
 
 
It is often supposed that the costs of production are threefold, 
corresponding to the rewards of labour, enterprise, and accumulation. 
But there is a fourth cost, namely risk; and the reward of risk-bearing 
is one of the heaviest, and perhaps the most avoidable, burden on 
production. 
2. 
Pricing 
Investment 
Risk 
J.M. Keynes, Preface to A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923).  
The essential difference between the defined benefit pension 
scheme and the defined contribution scheme is where the 
investment risk resides. Under the defined contribution scheme, 
investment risk is borne by the pension saver and, on retirement, 
the pensioner. The investment risk is very material, but it does have 
a market price so it can be valued. 
Let us illustrate how to estimate the market price of investment 
risk. Consider a pension saver who wishes to provide a pension of a 
unit of wages at retirement from his 65th birthday until his assumed 
death on his 85th birthday. The present value of such a pension is 
clearly a function of the saver’s current age and the rate of return 
above wage growth his investments earn both prior to and after 
retirement. For simplicity, we assume the same rate of return on 
investments both before and after retirement. Figure 1 outlines the 
present value of such a pension for a person at various ages and for 
various assumed rates of return above wage escalation. 
The graph illustrates well the sensitivity of the present value of 
the ultimate pension to the rate of return above salary growth. As 
developed later in this section, the graph can be used to price 
investment risk for a pension saver. 
Individual pension savers must be amongst the most risk-averse 
savers in the economy. Indeed, the arguments for mandatory 
pension provision become especially convincing only when the lack 
of pension provision at a certain minimum level triggers an 
obligation on society to make good the shortfall. So society’s 
concern is to ensure that everyone has a certain minimum pension. 
Accordingly, national pension policy is primarily concerned with 
those making modest provision, which must be invested in 
securities that promise the most secure pension.2  
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2 Equivalently, if it is argued that such savers can tolerate investment risk then the 
level of compulsory savings is clearly set at too high a level. Those saving more 
than that required to provide the minimum required pension may, of course, 
assume a higher level of investment risk once the probability of achieving the 
minimum pension is not lowered. 
Figure 1: Present Value of a Pension of One Unit of Wages Payable for Twenty Years 
from Age 65 Years, for a Person at Various Ages, as a Function of Investment 
Return above Wage Escalation  
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The minimum pension required by society should be at least 
inflation-linked to maintain purchasing power or, better, wage-
linked, as relative property measures are arguably more appropriate 
in a developed economy. The least-risk investment strategy for such 
savers is to invest in securities the proceeds of which are guaranteed 
to rise in line with inflation (ideally wage inflation but, failing that, 
consumer price inflation). Bonds with proceeds linked to consumer 
price inflation have been issued in many euro economies so by 
comparing the guaranteed real return from these assets with the best 
estimate of the proceeds from more risky assets, an assessment can 
be made of the market value of the risk in the risky asset.  
So the least risk investment strategy – and the most appropriate 
investment strategy for modest pension savers and mandated 
savings – is to invest in index-linked bonds of suitable duration. 
Taking real yields on long-term state guaranteed index-linked bonds 
to be of the order of 2 per cent (consistent with current market 
rates) and real wage escalation to be of the order of 2 per cent per 
annum (which is of the order of wage increases seen over the long-
term past) then the return differential above wage escalation is 0 per 
cent. Consulting Figure 1 a crude approximation to the market price 
of such a pension would be 20 wage units per unit of pension from 
age 65 years (i.e., the saver’s post-retirement life expectancy), 
irrespective of the current age of the saver.   
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Now investing in more risky assets can be expected to increase 
the expected return. Assuming, for instance, a diversified portfolio 
of equities gives a real return of 5 per cent per annum on average 
over the long term then the expected return above wage escalation 
is 3 per cent per annum. Consulting Figure 1 indicates that the 
present value of such a pension is 7.2 units for a 40 year old (with a 
higher value for older persons and lower for younger ones). In our 
example, the market cost of the pension to a 40 year old, assuming 
equity risk, is 7.2; the cost with no risk is 20; so the market cost of 
the investment risk is 12.8. We note the materiality of investment 
risk in this illustrative example: the cost of investment risk is almost 
double the present value of the pension assuming equity risk. Used 
in this manner, Figure 1 gives a rough-and-ready estimate of the 
market value of a pension, assuming different levels of investment 
risk, or, as used in the example, it gives the market price of the 
investment risk assumed. 
The above example was not arbitrarily chosen, but reflects 
assumptions made in the Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006). In 
Table 1, we summarise the real returns, investing expenses and the 
real rate of wage growth in the very long term assumed in the 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) and highlight the net return above 
wage growth it entails for different investment strategies. 
Table 1: Real Returns, Investing Expenses and Real Wage Escalation, Based on 
Assumptions in Pensions Board Reports (2005, 2006)  
Investment Strategy 
 
Real Return Investing 
Expenses 
Real Salary  
Increase3 
Net Return 
above Salary 
Escalation 
 % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. 
100% Equities 6.00 0.65 2.0 +3.35 
100% Government Bonds 1.75 0.10 2.0 -0.35 
100% Index-linked Bonds 1.75 0.10 2.0 -0.35 
     
75% Equities, 25% Bonds 4.94 0.51 2.0 +2.43 
50% Equities, 50% Bonds 3.88 0.38 2.0 +1.50 
     
100% Equities up to 10 
Years to Retirement then 
100% Bonds 
 
4.50 
 
0.42 
 
2.0 
 
+2.08 
     
 
The costings for the different pension systems in Pensions 
Board (2005, 2006) reports do not allow for the market price of the 
risk assumed. Accordingly, in our earlier example, the cost of the 
pension for a saver investing wholly in equities is put at about 7.2 by 
the method underlying the figures produced by the Pensions Board. 
This is materially different from the market-consistent value of 20, 
which assumes minimal investment risk. 
The detailed figures of the Pension Board reports assume the 
individual pension saver will invest over half in equities on average, 
 
3 Real salary increases are estimated at 3 per cent per annum currently falling to a 
long-run average of 2 per cent per annum from the year 2021. Accordingly, the 
table above somewhat overstates the return above wage escalation up to 2021.  
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and the state, through the National Pensions Reserve Fund will 
invest four-fifths or so in equities (Pensions Board 2005, pp. 215-6). 
By ignoring risk and its possible consequences, the mathematics 
lead to the conclusion that the more risk taken the less one needs to 
save – the complete opposite to the more pertinent logic that the 
more risk undertaken the greater one must save for a certain 
minimum level of pension. In fact the figures provided in the 
reports lead to many anomalies – that pensions are cheapest if 
provided by the state (as the National Pensions Reserve Fund’s 
higher risk tolerance is assumed to produce a real return of 4.6 per 
cent, higher than the 3.6 per cent real return assumed for defined 
contribution arrangements) and that, in fact, the state can turn a 
worthwhile profit by issuing bonds at a 1.75 per cent real return and 
using the proceeds to buy equities with a real return of 5.35 per cent 
per annum. These anomalies are a consequence of taking credit for 
investment risk by assuming higher returns, and not modelling the 
consequences of that investment risk.4  
We propose that the more appropriate value to use is the 
market-consistent value. Aside from placing a considerably higher 
present value on any pension, the market-consistent approach also 
entails dramatically higher contribution rates to provide for a 
pension. Figure 2 graphs the level contribution rate required over a 
working lifetime (assumed to be 40 years up to age 65 years) to 
provide for a pension of half salary from age 65 years at different 
rates of return above wage growth. Again, death is assumed to 
occur on the pensioner’s 85th birthday. 
The marked dependency of the contribution rate on the assumed 
return is evident. Note in particular, that the contribution rate is 25 
per cent of salary per annum to provide a pension of half salary at a 
0 per cent rate of return above wage escalation while at a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4It must be said that the costings in the Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006)  
reflect an approach common in the pensions industry in Ireland, the UK and 
elsewhere. It is difficult to model investment risk satisfactorily (see Appendix) 
whence our adoption of a market-consistent approach to investment risk. Note 
that MacDonald and Cairns (2007) attempt to model explicitly the impact of 
investment risk on retirement behaviour in an economy where each individual 
bears investment risk and has complete discretion of the investment strategy 
pursued. They conclude that “…the unpredictability of the financial markets could 
produce ambiguous and unmanageable retirement ages…” and note that the most 
stable outcome is produced when everyone maintains very high concentrations in 
index-linked bonds.  
Figure 2: Level of Contribution Rate as a Percentage of Salary over Working Life of 40 Years 
to Provide a Pension of Half Salary from Age 65 Years under Various Assumed 
Rates of Return Above Wage Escalation  
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positive 3 per cent differential the contribution rate is 9.9 per cent.5   
Figure 2 also highlights the cost of achieving the national pension 
target of half salary under different return assumptions. If 
investment risk is minimised then the real investment return over 
salary growth is of the order of 0 per cent, pointing to a market-
consistent cost of about one-quarter of salary per annum over the 
entire working lifetime. If, further, an allowance of, say, 1 per cent 
per annum is made for administration costs (see discussion later), 
then the cost of the pension is about one-third salary in each year. If 
such a level of saving appears unrealistic then so too is the national 
pension target. 
The price of the investment risk determined above is sensitive to 
the real returns assumed on different asset classes and to real wage 
escalation.  Appendix I sets out a concise overview of the literature 
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5 A case can be made that public sector pensions, which have a state guarantee like 
index-linked stock, should be valued at 0 per cent in Figure 2 while other 
occupational pensions with largely equity-backed security should be discounted at 3 
per cent to account appropriately for the higher risk. This suggests that the market 
value of public sector pensions is of the order of 25 per cent of salary per annum 
while the equivalent pension from the private sector only about 10 per cent. If a 
true market approach is adopted, this difference of 15 per cent or so per annum 
should be taken into account in ‘benchmarking’ public sector remuneration against 
that of the private sector.  
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in this area and provides data from the markets that broadly support 
the figures in Table 1. The Appendix also discusses the considerable 
uncertainty surrounding the expected return from risky assets, 
especially in the context of those targeting a preset pension. It is the 
considerable uncertainty in the performance of risky assets over 
both the long and short term that leads to such high rewards for 
risk bearers. In short, we cannot build a durable pension system on 
the shaky and unreliable foundation that is provided by the expected 
returns from risky assets. 
The above considerations, centring on investment risk and its 
market price, lead to a rather simple policy recommendation: the 
state should issue and maintain a broad and liquid market in index-
linked bonds with maturities up to 60 years. The recommendation 
imposes no cost on the state, as the conversion of current 
outstanding nominal bonds to index-linked bonds will be done at 
market rates. Yet the simple innovation gives pension savers 
instruments to reduce significantly the risk in pension saving and, by 
so doing, gives transparency to the ultimate pension (a key 
characteristic of the defined benefit plan). Such instruments provide 
a valuable safeguard against the mis-selling of investment risk to the 
risk-averse pension saver. For mandatory savings, the presumed 
need to provide for a minimum level of pension entails that 
investment risk be eschewed so investment in index-linked 
securities should be mandatory.6 Indeed, as developed in the next 
section, the insight that compulsory pension savings should be 
invested in index-linked state guaranteed stock leads on to a greater 
insight that produces a more efficient method to provide minimum 
pensions. 
The above recommendation echoes calls for an index-linked 
bond issuance policy to help manage pension liabilities by, amongst 
others, Healy (1996), Fitzgerald (2005), recent petitions from leading 
industry-wide pension schemes and from professional bodies such 
as the Society of Actuaries in Ireland. Other mechanisms to transfer risk 
away from the pension saver have been made by Kehoe (2003); 
IAPF (2005); Whelan (2005a, 2006), but the simple market-based 
approach of issuing index-linked gilts has the considerable merit 
that it is costless and straightforward to implement. 
We conclude this section by summarising. The defined benefit 
scheme design is ideal from the perspective of the pension saver as 
it shifts investment risk and gives transparency to the quantum of 
pension ultimately payable. Defined contribution arrangements can 
achieve these key benefits if there is a broad and liquid market in 
index-linked bonds. The state, at negligible cost, can maintain a 
market in index-linked bonds. The simple innovation of an index-
6 Some have suggested the state guarantee a minimum return on compulsory 
retirement accounts. This suggestion is incompatible with investment freedom as 
the guarantee is a put option for the investor, the value of which is increased by 
following a more risky investment strategy. In short, the presence of such a 
guarantee encourages risk-taking by investors at the cost of the state. The logic for 
compulsory saving leads, as outlined in the text, to controls on the investment 
freedom permitted.  
linked market in Ireland will enable pension savers to provide low 
risk pensions for themselves. However, if compulsory savings in 
defined contribution arrangements is proposed (as outlined in 
Pensions Board (2006) report) then investment in such state 
guaranteed index-linked stock should be mandatory to provide for a 
minimum pension. This later conclusion points to an even better 
design of a compulsory pension savings scheme, as developed 
below. 
 
 To allow retirement in an economy, the retired must have claims 
over current production to facilitate their consumption when not 
themselves producing. The claim over current production can be 
organised in two ways: via the financial markets or via the state 
through the so-called ‘social contract’, which requires that the 
working generation contribute on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis to 
the retired generation. The financial contract route is pre-funded, as 
the pension provider builds up a portfolio of financial claims. The 
PAYG approach is often identified with an unfunded approach. 
The Pensions Board (2005) is equivocal on whether to pre-fund or 
not, arguing “…the difference between funding and PAYG is only a 
different means of organising the future transfer of assets…. The 
difference between funding and PAYG is the difference between 
the uncertainty of future asset values and the uncertainty of future 
taxation” (p. 57). The report fails to discuss the issue further simply 
noting that “the economic theory of funding versus PAYG is quite 
involved and its relevance to the assignment in hand is 
questionable” (ibid. p.184).  
3. 
Financing 
Pensions: to 
Fund or Not to 
Fund? 
Let us consider a little deeper the simple policy recommendation 
above that the state maintain a market in index-linked securities, 
sufficiently broad and deep to allow pension savers to monitor and 
manage investment risk. Such a commitment is simply an 
undertaking by the state that future taxation revenues be applied to 
meet its obligations under the debt instruments. This commitment 
creates a system that is functionally almost identical to the PAYG 
system, under which future taxation meets the costs of the social 
obligation. The key differences between the contrasting system – 
defined contribution arrangements investing in government 
guaranteed index-linked stock or a PAYG scheme – may 
conveniently be discussed under two main headings: pricing or 
value-for-money and administration. 
 
 In capital markets, the price of index-linked stock, like any other 
financial asset, is set by supply and demand in the context of the 
price of all other capital market securities. The extensive Appendix 
I, shows that, on average over the long term, a real return of about 2 
per cent per annum or so has been delivered on reasonably low risk 
investments. With wages growing in real terms by about 2 per cent 
per annum on average over the long term, this gives a long- term 
return above wage escalation of approximately 0 per cent per 
4. 
Pricing or 
Value-For-
Money 
 64
 65
 
annum. It is of primary concern to the contributors of any PAYG 
system that it can deliver comparable returns. 
The mathematics underlying the PAYG approach gives a very 
neat answer to the return sustainably deliverable under such a 
system (anticipated in Samuelson (1958)).  For sustainability, we 
must consider an idealised stationary population, where the number 
of workers entering in any year equals the number of deaths. 
Consider such a stationary population with workers contributing a 
fixed percentage of wages and total contributions divided as pension 
payments to the retired population. Viewed from the perspective of 
an individual, the internal rate of return from such a system is 
calculated by solving the equation of value that puts the present 
value of contributions paid over a working lifetime (discounted at 
the required rate of return i equal to the present value of the 
pension from retirement (discounted at the same rate of return, i. 
Intuitively, the contributor will get out everything he puts in (by the 
stationary assumption) and, as each calendar year passes, the 
increase will be in line with the increase in wages. This leads us to 
speculate that the rate of return, i, will be the same as the rate of 
wage escalation. This insight turns out to be true (see endnote†). In 
short, in a stationary population, the PAYG system of financing 
delivers a return comparable to the expected return on a low risk 
portfolio of assets. Indeed, the PAYG system is somewhat superior 
in several respects, in that: (i) the return to contributors is explicitly 
linked to wage escalation, a linkage that no existing capital security 
gives but is ideal to maintain relative income levels in an economy; 
(ii) the rate of return is applied to future as well as current 
contributions, a guarantee that is impractical to synthesize through 
the capital markets; and (iii) it ensures that the ultimate pension is 
not dependent on the performance of the markets, the investment 
policy pursued by the individual, the solvency of financial 
institutions, or other factors that could conspire to frustrate the 
objectives of pension policy. In place of all these risks, it substitutes 
the single risk that the social contract will be honoured by future 
generations. 
The above result only applies to stationary working populations. 
The working population in Ireland is not stationary but has been 
growing rapidly of late. The internal return to the retired in a strictly 
operated PAYG system when the workforce is growing is above the 
weighted average growth of wages in the economy as there is an 
excess of contributors. This extraordinary value for money was 
remarked upon by Paul Samuelson7: “…the beauty of social 
insurance is that it is actuarially unsound. Everyone who reaches 
retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he 
has paid in… A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever 
contrived”. However, such enhanced returns are only sustainable if 
the working population grows indefinitely. Rather than pay out such 
enhanced pensions, a better approach is for the state to invest the 
surplus contributions. This would not only ensure intergenerational 
7 As quoted in “Snares and Delusions”, The Economist, 14 February 2002. 
equity (as all contributors get the same return) but also the financial 
sustainability of the system, as the surplus funds would be invested 
in global capital assets which, according to reasonable expectations, 
would produce a return from a low risk investment portfolio of the 
order of wage escalation. These surplus funds could then be drawn 
upon when future contributors are below the number required to 
support the retired in a stationary population.8 
 
 The two contrasting systems – defined contribution arrangements 
investing in index-linked stock or the sustainable PAYG scheme 
with an element of pre-funding – might also differ in their 
administration. The PAYG system would be run by a single entity 
(the state, as at present, or an organisation the state appoints) while 
the other is generally envisaged to work in a free but regulated 
market, with many provident institutions competing for market 
share. Arguments as to which model is preferable centre on the 
perceived better service and greater innovation in the competitive 
market model against the economies of scale a monopoly provider 
can achieve. The issue of quality of service versus cost of service is a 
debate that cannot be resolved neatly.  
5. 
Administration 
Mahon (2005) gives an overview of the issues, a survey of the 
literature and a case study of economies of scale within Irish 
occupational pension schemes. He shows that small schemes have 
costs a multiple of times higher than large schemes per member. 
Such costs can best be expressed as a ‘reduction in yield’ (RIY) for 
our purposes and Mahon (2005) estimates the costs so expressed to 
vary from over 3 per cent of assets per annum for small schemes to 
about 0.3 per cent per annum for larger schemes. These costs are 
very material in the context of investment returns of the same order 
of magnitude and, with the aid of Figures 1 and 2, we can estimate 
the impact of such costs on the ultimate pension. Table 2 illustrates 
the magnitude of the reduction in pension as a function of 
administration costs pre-retirement and the investment return 
before administration costs (but after expenses of investment). 
Table 2 shows, for instance, that factoring in administration 
costs of 1 per cent per annum in the accumulation phase, reduces 
the ultimate pension by between 18 per cent to 21 per cent per 
annum (as the assumed investment return increases from 0 per cent 
to 4 per cent per annum). In fact, it is clear from Table 2 that the 
reduction in pension is highly sensitive to the assumed 
administration costs but the reduction is not particularly sensitive to 
the investment return assumed. A rule-of-thumb can summarise the 
import of Table 2: extra administration costs of 0.5 per cent per annum in 
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8 Of course, the state might adopt a more aggressive investment strategy, as 
currently pursued by the National Pension Reserve Fund. The essential point, 
though, is that the state guarantees returns to contributors and charges for those 
guarantees at a rate consistent with long-term market rates.  
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the accumulation phase will reduce the ultimate pension by about 10 per cent per 
annum.  
Table 2: Percentage Reduction of Ultimate Pension Due to Impact 
of Administration Costs in the Accumulation Phase 
(expressed as reduction in yield), as a Function of the 
Investment Return above Wage Escalation in the 
Accumulation Phase 
Administration 
Costs (RIY) 
Investment Return above Wage Escalation in 
Accumulation Phase 
(before administration costs) 
% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 
      
2.00 31 33 34 36 37 
1.75 28 30 31 32 33 
1.50 25 26 27 29 30 
1.25 21 23 24 25 25 
1.00 18 19 19 20 21 
0.75 14 14 15 16 16 
0.50 9 10 10 11 11 
0.25 5 5 5 6 6 
0.00 0 0 0 0 0 
Assumptions: Pension is payable for 20 years from age 65 years, increasing in line 
with wage increases. Net investment return in retirement (decumulation phase) is 0 
per cent above wage escalation. Once off administration charge of 3 per cent of 
assets on retirement. Accumulation period 40 years to age 65 years. 
 
Turner (2004, Appendix C) includes a discussion of the costs of 
different administration structures and puts explicit administration 
costs at 0.3 per cent of assets for occupational schemes and 0.8 per 
cent for personal pensions. The administration costs assumed by 
Turner (2004) are probably below what an Irish pension saver 
would have to pay. The Pensions Board (2005, pp. 226-7) estimates 
that administration costs on personal accounts to be of the order of 
1.3 per cent to 1.5 per cent per annum pre-retirement and, on 
retirement, a once-off charge of 3 per cent of assets is assumed.  
The conclusion is that economies of scale are material in pension 
provision. According to estimates in the Pensions Board (2005) 
report, extra charges associated with maintaining individual 
retirement accounts are of the order of 1 per cent to 1.2 per cent 
per annum (that is 1.3 per cent-1.5 per cent less the 0.3 per cent 
RIY of a monopoly provider). Assuming extra charges of 1 per cent 
per annum, the associated reduction in pension is of the order of 20 
per cent. Murthi et al. (1999) gives empirical support to this 
assessment, estimating that pensions are reduced by one-quarter due 
to costs associated with operating individual retirement accounts in 
the UK (both investment and administration). 
The above estimates assume that there is no change in the 
pension provider over the entire accumulation phase of four 
decades. If pension providers are changed then costs increase 
further. Murthi et al. (1999) reports that the costs of switching from 
one provider of individual retirement accounts to another (or 
ceasing contributions with one and starting with another) will 
reduce the ultimate pension by approximately a further 15 per cent. 
Extra charges of this magnitude inhibit movement between 
providers, so reducing competition in the market. 
We conclude that extra charges associated with individual 
retirement accounts will reduce the ultimate pension by about one-
fifth. Since, from our earlier discussion, the pension contracts types 
are standard, offering guaranteed proceeds, it is difficult to envisage 
how service can justify the significant financial impact of the loss of 
economies of scale identified above. 
 
 There are details to be worked out in the operations of the 
envisaged PAYG system, stabilised by pre-funding. Yet the 
principle underpinning the system design is value-for-money for 
contributors – that is, contributors get a return on their 
contributions equivalent to the market return on low risk 
investments. Details that require consideration include formalising 
the social contract so that it becomes more akin to a financial 
contract. This entails ensuring that contributions will remain a fixed 
percentage of wages and that contributions give an enforceable 
entitlement to a corresponding pension, the pension to increase in 
line with the weighted average wage growth in the economy. It is 
necessary to specify how the system will be modified if life 
expectancies change (see, for instance, Turner (2006) for some 
interesting suggestions) and specify how the system will treat 
persons who help achieve ‘the common good’ but are not in paid 
employment.  The greatest challenge is, though, how to invest such 
commitments by the state with credibility. As envisaged above, the 
system is sustainable and self-financing so there is no reason why an 
organisation at arms-length from the state cannot operate the 
system. This would entail removing political discretion from state 
pensions, a particular challenge given its historic importance to Irish 
politics (see Ó Gráda, 2002).  
6. 
Key Principle 
of Design 
 
 Whether based on financial or social contracts, it is necessary that 
there is a sufficiently large working population to support the rest of 
the population under any pension system. The projections of the 
Central Statistics Office, CSO (2004), which were used in the 
costings of alternative pension systems, assumes that fertility rates in 
Ireland will fall below replacement rate to between 1.7 and 2.0 over 
the foreseeable future, with a medium assumption of 1.85. Unless 
immigration is maintained at a high level, this projection puts 
pressure on the sustainability of any pension system in the very long 
term. 
7. 
Sustainability 
in the Very 
Long Term 
Fertility rates below the replacement level of approximately 2.1 
are commonplace not only in developed economies but also in 
more developing ones, as highlighted in Figure 3. In particular the 
fertility rates of EU-15 countries are amongst the lowest in the 
world and the new accession countries have even lower fertility 
rates (e.g., Poland and Slovenia at 1.25). In most regions of the 
world, as the map makes clear, the population is not replacing itself.  
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Figure 3: Map of Estimates of Total Fertility Rates, 2006 
 
Sources: The World Factbook 2006, Central Intelligence Agency. Map sourced from Wikipedia under GNU Free 
Documentation License. 
 
The low fertility rates across the world have a direct impact on 
Ireland. First, it can be anticipated that there will be downward 
pressure on the future returns from capital markets caused by 
weaker demand from the smaller future working (and saving) 
generations. The size of the impact is less easy to forecast but 
modelling done by, inter alia, Miles (1999; Brooks (2000); Turner 
(2003); and Miles and Černý (2006) are suggestive that a fall in the 
long-term return of ½ per cent per annum can be expected. This 
shades downwards the estimates based on long run historic 
statistics. Second, fertility and migration policy are intimately linked 
to pensions policy in the long term. In particular, the state might 
encourage higher fertility. One policy option, compatible with the 
PAYG system, is to give an increment of pension for each child 
reared.9 Equally, pension policy might encompass policies aimed at 
making Ireland more attractive to immigrant workers than other 
competing economies. To encourage immigration further might 
require some radical initiatives and, in the fullness of time, require a 
rebalancing in the relative taxation of capital and labour when 
labour replaces capital as the scarce and mobile factor of 
production. These considerations are obviously longer term (longer 
than the 50 year projections in the Pensions Board (2005, 2006)) 
reports but must be borne in mind and inform pension policy. 
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9 Such a policy also helps ensure that parents’ limited resources are directly 
invested in the development of the next generation, and not otherwise directed to 
pension saving. 
This paper attempts to identify some principles that might help 
guide the design and financing of pension provision in Ireland for 
the twenty-first century. We focus on the key difference between 
the two design templates of defined benefit and defined 
contribution, namely, who bears the investment risk. The price of 
investment risk is assessed on a market-consistent basis and its 
order of magnitude shown to be material.  
8. 
Conclusion 
It is argued that individual pension savers of modest means or 
those mandated to save must be considered risk-averse. A proposal 
is made that the state issue market instruments, at market price, to 
help these savers manage investment risk. This is represented as a 
costless innovation that significantly furthers the overall aims of 
national pension policy. For mandated pension savings designed to 
provide a minimum pension, investment in low risk instruments 
should be compulsory. The identification of state guaranteed index-
linked bonds of suitable duration as the low investments allows us 
to identify a more efficient method of providing minimum pensions 
than through personal retirement accounts.   
A sustainable PAYG system is contrasted with compulsory 
pension savings in low risk investments. Ignoring administration 
costs, the two systems are seen to be very similar and deliver very 
similar value-for-money for contributors. The PAYG system was 
seen to have some second-order advantages. Factoring in 
administration costs tilts the balance in favour of the PAYG system 
as it can deliver better value for money through economies of scale. 
Of course, the framework for compulsory pension provision in 
Ireland has been a PAYG system for almost a hundred years. This 
system needs to be refined in two ways. First, it requires an element 
of pre-funding to ensure that it is sustainable in the long term. 
Second, the social contract it represents needs to be better defined 
so it more closely approximates a financial contract with, in 
particular, greater clarity on the rights of contributors and 
beneficiaries. 
In conclusion, the argument developed in the paper is against 
the introduction of special retirement savings accounts suggested in 
Pensions Board (2006) report. Figures presented show that, for the 
same level of contributions, such accounts will lead to pensions 
lower by at least 10 per cent, and probably closer to 20 per cent, 
than those delivered by the alternative sustainable PAYG system 
proposed.   
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APPENDIX I: 
ESTIMATING THE 
REAL LONG-TERM 
RATE OF RETURN ON 
RISKY ASSETS 
Risky investments, by definition, deliver uncertain payoffs. Yet for 
several important purposes it is necessary to have an estimate, with 
some appreciation for its accuracy, of the long-term average payoff 
from a diversified portfolio of risky assets. Such purposes include 
(a) informing the individual’s decision on whether to consume or 
save, (b) estimating the amount to save for a given targeted sum or 
pension and (c) evaluating the opportunity costs incurred by 
following a less risky or matching strategy. Estimating the 
magnitude of the return from a diversified portfolio of risky assets 
is thus a fundamental problem in an economy. In turn, the risk 
premium demanded by investors from time to time gives valuable 
information on the outlook for the economy. 
A.I 
Introduction 
If the portfolio of risky assets is limited to include only equities 
listed on recognised exchanges we find a considerable literature 
devoted to the problem. The term ‘equity risk premium’ (ERP) has 
been coined to denote the expected additional return from a 
diversified portfolio of equities over a riskless investment. The 
riskless investment has been variously taken to be cash instruments, 
such as short-term Treasury bills or, to provide a better match for 
the term of the equity investment, returns on gilt-edged stock of 
long maturity.  
Welch (2000, 2001), amongst others, shows that estimates of the 
future long-term equity risk premium tend to be anchored in the 
long term ex post ERP, despite arguments that the historic ERP 
appears too high to be considered solely as a premium for risk-
taking (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Knowledge of the historic ERP 
recorded in different economies, with different growth trajectories, 
can give valuable insights into estimating the future ERP.   
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Capital markets in the modern form are relatively recent 
innovations. Homer and Sylla (1996) give a comprehensive 
overview of the historical evolution of interest rates, tracing them 
back five millennia and documenting their level through every major 
economy in modern times. Homer and Sylla (1996) and Homer 
(1997) make a persuasive case that modern long and short-term 
interest rate markets can be traced no further back than Holland of 
the seventeenth century and England from the eighteenth century. 
The Dutch developed the notion of a national debt, funded from 
the taxation revenues of a stable and dependable system of 
government. The Dutch system of finance migrated to England 
with King William of Orange, and from England was spread to 
Ireland, America, and elsewhere. Accordingly, we can date the 
beginning of modern fixed interest markets from about 1700. 
A.II 
History of 
Modern 
Capital 
Markets 
The history of long-term interest rates in modern times is 
summarised in Figure I.1, which traces long-term interest rates of 
almost the entire western world every year from 1700, with 
particular emphasis on those currencies to which Ireland’s is or has 
been pegged. Specifically, the graph shows sovereign long bond 
yields from 1700 in the UK, from 1746 in France, from 1798 in the 
US, from (what was to become) Germany since 1815, and from 
Italy since 1861.  
Figure I.1: Annual Long Bond Yields, 1700-2002  
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Modern equity markets have an even shorter history. Scott 
(1912) details the establishment and development of the first limited 
liability companies in these isles, but the development of extensive 
markets in such shares was disrupted by the Bubble Act of 1720, 
which required an Act of Parliament to confer limited liability. 
While the Bubble Act did not apply in Ireland, it did hamper 
developments. It was not until legislative developments in the 
middle of the nineteenth century (particularly the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856) that limited liability became more widely 
availed of in the UK (including Ireland). Thomas (1986, p.144) 
recounts that, outside of the banking sector, there was just 47 
companies in Ireland with limited liability in September 1944 (of 
which 10 were listed on Irish stock exchanges) and this number was 
swelled by more than 2,500 incorporations over the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  
 
 The documented history of returns from equity markets prior to 
the twentieth, including the Irish markets, is as yet patchy (but for 
the markets in these isles, see Gayer et al. (1940), Grossman (2002) 
and the on-going project of Charles Hickson and John Turner of 
Queen’s University, Belfast). However, the returns from 1900 are 
now well documented. The real returns in each calendar year from 
each major market in Ireland from 1900 are summarised in 
graphical form in Figure I.2.  
A.III 
Investment 
Returns 
Figure I.2: Annual Real Returns from Irish Equity, Bond, and Cash Markets,  
1900-2002 
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Sources: See Whelan (2004). This source also gives details of returns above wage escalation in Ireland. 
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The return from each market over the 101 years to end 2000 is 
summarised below and compared with the returns from other 
national markets. 
Table I.1: Annualised Real Returns on Ireland and Major Markets, 101 Years Ending 31 
December 2000 
Country Equity Bonds Cash Inflation 
 % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. 
Ireland 4.7 1.0 0.7 4.5 
     
UK 5.8 1.3 1.0 4.1 
US 6.7 1.6 0.9 3.2 
Japan 4.5 -1.6 -2.0 7.6 
Netherlands 5.8 1.1 0.7 3.0 
Germany 3.6 -2.2 -0.6 5.1 
France 3.8 -1.0 -3.3 7.9 
Italy 2.7 -2.2 -4.1 9.1 
Spain 3.6 1.2 0.4 6.1 
Sources: For Ireland see Whelan (2004), otherwise figures taken from Tables 4-1 and 5-1 in Dimson et al. 
(2002). Figures for Germany exclude the two-year hyperinflationary period of 1922-23. If this 
episode was included then German inflation would go up to an annualised rate of about 34 per 
cent, cash returns fall to –19 per cent real per annum bond returns to –8.5 per cent, and 
equities to 4.5 per cent real per annum (Dimson et al., 2000). 
 
The returns from the Irish capital markets mirror that from 
other national markets. Inflation was roughly in line with 
international averages; equities considerably outperformed the two 
other asset classes and by roughly the same margin; bonds and cash 
struggled to keep ahead of inflation and posted similar modest real 
returns.  
 
 Investment risk is often measured as simply the standard deviation 
of the nominal or real return. Taken as the standard deviation of 
real returns, such a measure would put the investment risk of the 
Irish equity, long bond and cash markets at about 25 per cent, 12.5 
per cent, and 5 per cent respectively (see Whelan, 2002).  However, 
these popular risk measures are not appropriate to the pension saver 
whose risk relates to the uncertainty of the future pension, not to 
the uncertainty of the current value of the sums saved. Defining risk 
in terms of the targeted pension produces materially different, and 
generally higher, measures of investment risk. Whelan (2004) 
provides a detailed analysis and measurement of investment risk by 
assessing the variability of the ultimate pension under different 
investment strategies. The measure depends on, inter alia, the age of 
the pension saver. However, over a wide range of ages, the 
investment risk under this more appropriate definition is of a higher 
order of magnitude than the conventional measure and bears out 
our intuition in ranking cash as the highest risk for those targeting a 
predefined pension, followed by conventional bonds and equities. 
In particular, duration mismatch in bonds is shown to be of equal 
or sometimes even greater significance than equity risk. Finally, it is 
shown that index-linked bonds of suitable duration are the lowest 
risk investment for an index-linked pension. 
A.IV 
Investment 
Risk 
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The relatively paucity of data from the capital markets’ short 
history give little support to the often expressed view that 
investment risk from equities reduces as the time period of 
investment increases (the so-called ‘time diversification of risk’). In 
any event, such an effect, if present, is not so sufficiently 
pronounced as to be relied upon by risk averse pension savers. 
Examples may be cited of long periods where the cumulative real 
returns from equities were negative, such as the world equity market 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, such as the French 
and German equity markets over a period of more than 50 years 
(1900-1952 and 1900-1954 respectively), or such as the cumulative 
decline of 41 per cent in real terms of the Japanese equity market 
over the 1990s (see Dimson, Marsh et al. (2006), especially p.31). 
 
 The obvious approach to estimating the future equity risk 
premium (ERP) is to measure it historically and use this as a best 
estimate. Derrig and Orr (2004) provide a detailed overview of 
methods used to forecast the ERP in the much-studied US market. 
Many of the methods used simple averages or, more generally, 
assume that the returns are generated from a stationary stochastic 
process. But the empirical studies surveyed in Whelan (2005b) 
demonstrate that this assumption is not valid. In short, the risk of 
risky assets tends to change over time and thus the ERP, as a 
compensation for risk borne, can be expected to vary with time. 
Figure I.2 highlights the non-stationary of the returns delivered by 
the Irish equity market over the twentieth century.  Accordingly, 
forecasting the equity risk premium must be done in tandem with 
forecasting the expected course of the riskiness of the market. This 
compounds the problem as we are uncertain of the future riskiness 
of risky assets. 
A.V 
Estimating the 
Equity Risk 
Premium 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that the historical equity risk 
premium appears too large to be attributed solely as a premium for 
risk bearing, as such an attribution leads to risk aversion parameters 
that appear implausibly high. Other factors, such as borrowing 
constraints after the Second World War and the form of taxation, 
have been used to account for some of the observed excess return 
(McGrattan and Prescott, 2001). In so far as these latter factors are 
unlikely to operate to the same extent in the future then the ERP, as 
a pure premium for risk-bearing, must be lower than it has been 
observed in the past. 
Welch (2000) surveyed 226 academic financial economists 
between late 1997 and early 1999 and reports that estimates of the 
ERP (30-year arithmetic average relative to either 30-year bonds or 
short-term bills10) varied between 1.5 per cent and 15 per cent, with 
a mean of 7.1 per cent, and a median of 7.0 per cent. Of special 
interest is the subgroup of 17 academics that published at least one 
paper on the equity risk premium or aggregate stock returns. These 
 75
 
10 This pools the results of two different surveys of nearly equal numbers. The first 
asked the ERP relative to the 30-year bond and the second asked the ERP relative 
to short-term bills.  Coincidently, the average of the responses was almost the 
same for both groups. 
experts estimate the 30-year ERP somewhat lower, the average of 
this subgroup being 6.5 per cent.  
The respondents were mostly US based and it appears that they 
anchored their estimate about the historical averages based on the 
well documented experience of the US equity market in the period 
1926 to mid-1990s. Indeed, Welch provides evidence that the 
financial economists believed the consensus of other financial 
economists’ would be somewhat higher than their own (by about 
0.5 per cent) and that they appear to shade lower their estimate 
relative to their perceived consensus view. Welch (2001) updated 
the survey and reports that the same ERP estimate has now fallen to 
about 5 per cent to 5.5 per cent, even when the results were limited 
to that subset of the whole 510 respondents who had participated in 
the original survey. To summarise it appears that estimates of the 
long-term ERP are (a) anchored in long term historical averages, (b) 
shaded downwards slightly, and (c) the estimates are surprisingly 
sensitive to short-term returns on the market. 
Other authors, such as Shiller (2000, 2002); Thaler (2002); 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) challenge the assumption that investors 
behave rationally and attempt to account for the equity risk 
premium (and other apparent anomalies in markets) in terms of 
cultural, psychological, or structural factors. Thaler (2002), for 
instance, argues that investors suffer from ‘myopic loss aversion’, 
where they tend to be overly influenced by their recent market 
experiences and, in particular, place too great an emphasis on short-
term losses.11  
 
 There is an unhelpfully wide range of estimates for the ERP, even 
amongst academics publishing in the field. All the methods, whether 
by a formal statistical projection or a less formal adjustment of past 
returns to exclude episodes unlikely to recur, are anchored to 
greater or lesser extent on the ERP observed in the past.  
A.VI 
Conclusion 
Based on our summary of the long-term returns delivered by 
Irish and international capital markets, it would not be unreasonable 
to assume the following real (geometric) returns for the long-term 
future, not allowing for management and other expenses:  
Diversified equity portfolio:    3-5%  
Index-linked and nominal long bonds:  1-3%  
Cash:  ½%-1½% 
The above estimates are subject to the qualification that the 
returns from such risky assets will not be as expected. No doubt, 
this qualification is why the markets so generously reward the risk 
bearer as, as yet, there is no satisfactory model for investment risk. 
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11 Whatever about investors, Thaler’s thesis does account for the financial 
economists’ dramatic revision of the long term ERP between Welch (2000) and 
Welch (2001). 
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ENDNOTE 
† In standard actuarial notation, if r is the retirement age and x the 
age when contributions start then we have, 
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Rewriting gives: 
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Now, as suspected, i=0 per cent is clearly a solution. This solution 
can be seen to be unique for reasonable r by considering the 
derivative with respect to i of both sides. The import of this is that 
the internal rate of return to contributors in a stationary and 
sustainable PAYG system is equal to the weighted average rate of 
wage growth of contributors. 
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